This paper introduces a rational choice model for multiple kinds of participation to empirically investigate several theoretical determinants of Social Capital (SC) formation. The framework is rich enough to investigate the importance of individual variables, social/peer effects, endogenous trust, political-institutional, and inequality factors as sources of participation. We show that the aforementioned contextual factors explain SC formation for Chile, but their relative importance varies for each kind of participation. Our second application compares individual-level determinants of SC formation among the largest democracies in the Americas. Gender, age, education, and race show heterogeneous effects across countries. Overall, negative interpersonal trust shocks generate participation increments, and possibly motivate engagement in trustworthy networks.
Introduction
Despite much research effort, the importance of Social Capital (SC) determinants is not fully understood and its main mechanisms of formation remain largely untested. In the literature, SC formation is linked to individuals' characteristics, such as gender, race, age, and education, as well as to contextual variables including inequality, racial diversity, institutions, and political designs (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Freitag 2006; Hero 2007; Putnam 2000) . Building on these insights, we construct and estimate an eclectic empirical model, taking into account several parameter identification and statistical issues generally overlooked. Our setup opens the black box of aggregate data indices, often used in empirical analysis, to portray the multiple aspects of SC formation, recognizing their heterogeneity and interrelation. Using the model, we test hypotheses advocated by various strands of the literature in two applications. First, using unusually rich contextual data, we estimate a model for Chile to understand what determines participation and trust at the municipal level. Second, we estimate comparable models of SC formation for the USA, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile. From our empirical exercises, we reconceptualize certain aspects of SC formation.
We highlight multiple aspects of SC formation. First, we focus on participation in social organizations (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 2000 as a rational-choice individual SC investment, given personal and contextual characteristics. Second, we consider social effects of individual decisions, i.e. participation externalities on associative life, an aspect mentioned by Coleman (1990) and formalized by Durlauf (2002) . Third, we introduce general trust (Coleman 1990; Newton 2006; Putnam 1993 ) as a key determinant of social participation, and explicitly deal with its endogenous nature. Fourth, we consider the political and institutional designs in the process of SC formation, as driving forces for associative life and trust (Freitag 2006) . Fifth, we study other aspects highlighted in the literature such as income inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000) , and make international comparisons (Klesner 2007; Rossteutscher 2008) . Finally, we consider several arenas of social participation (religious, parental, community, professional, and political associations), acknowledging their heterogeneity and mutual influences.
Our model is based on a utility maximization problem of participation intensity, given individual and contextual variables. To identify the causal effect of trust on participation, we use crime victimization as an instrumental variable (IV), employing the framework of Angrist et al. (2000) . We borrow from Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) to build a linear model amenable to standard IV techniques that appropriately traits the ordinal nature of empirical measures of participation and trust. Finally, we allow for free cross-equation correlations across multiple kinds of participation and trust intensities.
Our first application estimates a model for the SC formation process in Chile, a country with solid economic and institutional performance in Latin America (Kalter et al. 2004) . With rich information at the municipal level, we study key factors for individual SC formation at municipal level (Freitag 2006) . We address the role of government institutions on SC formation that other papers neglect (Oxendine et al. 2007 ). We choose this focus because municipalities are the primary link between people and government (Hiskey and Bowler 2005) . Moreover, Chilean municipalities are comparable to one another in a single unitary political and economic national context. Municipal data sources are the CASEN 1 household survey; the SINIM 2 database with institutional, budgetary, and performance measures at the municipal level; and the SERVEL 3 electoral database. Both of our applications use the LAPOP 4 database, which provides individual data on participation, trust, and other personal characteristics.
For the detailed Chilean case, all mechanisms of SC formation are relevant. The importance of each element varies from one kind of participation to another, confirming the inner heterogeneity of the SC formation process. Only religious participation and trust are explained by social effects.
Political-institutional factors seem relevant in all categories, except parental and professional. The mayor's political party affects parental and community participation. Inequality within educational groups has a negative impact for community participation, while inequality between groups negatively affects religious, professional, and political participation. Community and political participation are lower for middle-class municipalities. The Chilean earthquake of 2010 promoted more intense community and professional participation, but individual experiences of vandalism and neighborhood damages hurts trust.
Our second application estimates SC formation models for comparisons across the three most populated democracies in the Americas (USA, Brazil, and Mexico) and Chile. This exercise uncovers relevant individual-level features for multiple kinds of participation and trust, controlling for geographical and time effects. The comparisons show few regularities among the countries studied. To some extent, the SC formation in the USA is the most distinctive. Female participation in religious and parental categories is greater in all cases, except the USA. Compared to the other countries, the USA age profiles show relatively higher participation and trust among the elderly, except for the parental category. Schooling increases all kinds of participation and trust in the USA, and all except religious in Mexico, but has considerably lower impact in Brazil and Chile. Race/ethnicity is also a stronger factor behind SC formation in the USA. Married individuals participate more in In both applications, a trust reduction triggered by being a crime victim (or receiving a bribe request) generates an increase of participation, except for non-significant effects in Chile for some categories. Presumably, due to the loss of trust, individuals become involved more in organizations to interact with people sharing similar values and interests. Nevertheless, the evidence also shows that unobserved participation and trust factors, probably psychological or cultural features, are strongly positively correlated. Together, these results suggest that (1) in Chile, SC formation is largely determined by individual observable traits, with contextual factors playing a secondary role (except for political); (2) in both applications, exogenous negative shocks to trust spur participation, at least among people more sensitive to crime, suggesting that self-interest actions may generate SC formation; and (3) unobserved idiosyncratic traits jointly produce higher trust and participation, inducing a non-causal positive correlation that could be misunderstood as a "virtuous circle" of SC creation. Thus, our empirical approach to SC formation uncovers factors hidden by assumptions in some of the previous literature.
Literature Background and Conceptualization
The SC research agenda, starting with Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman (1990) (Bjørnskov 2006; Newton 2006) . Instead, the prevailing focus is on the effects of SC on a variety of topics, such as civic engagement and democracy (Kim 2005; Maloney et al. 2008; Putnam 1993 Putnam , 2000 , and a number of economic outcomes (Knack and Keefer 1997) . SC formation is usually measured as participation in organizations, associative life, and related indicators (Putnam 2000) , usually linked to civic attitudes, trust, and social networks (Putnam 1993; Von Erlach 2005) . Many studies consider associative life as a subject of study in cross national and sub-national comparative research (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Freitag 2006; Wagle 2006) , which justifies our focus on the investment in SC via involvement in organizations or participation. Consequently, we take participation in social activities as a quantification of the individual's involvement in social networks.
Like Putnam (2000) , many researchers construct indices of SC using ad hoc addition of categorical variables or factor analysis, imposing strong a priori constraints on multiple SC facets. These practices seem misaligned with the evidence (Bjørnskov 2006) , and complicate our learning about factors that explain SC formation. Moreover, the relation between trust and participation is weak or even negative in some individual-level studies (Rossteutscher 2008; Rothstein and Stolle 2008) . Similarly, the aggregation of different kinds of participation seems unfounded. Putnam (2000) reports that individual factors (ethnicity, age, etc.) specifically affect kinds of participation. Organizations attract specific people, and offer particular networks, norms, values, and styles that may oppose or complement other groups. For instance, race and ethnicity explain involvement differences between "bonding" and "bridging" types of association (Manzano 2004 (Manzano , 2007 A rational choice perspective on participation naturally entails an empirical individual-level approach. The SC literature considers individual socioeconomic and demographic variables to explain participation and civic engagement (Morjé and Gilbert 2008; Von Erlach 2005) . Resources, tastes, and needs that determine participation vary with education, age, gender, marital status, race, and religion. Education provides skills useful for social interactions. Life-cycle and generational aspects shape social participation (Putnam 2000) . Gender matters due to biological and socially defined cultural differences. Family characteristics simultaneously impact needs, tastes, and available resources for social participation. Race and religion affect a cultural background linked to individual choices, and interact with community characteristics (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Hero 2007 ).
Putnam (2000, 94) highlights correlations among several forms of associative life: "doing any one of these activities substantially increases your likelihood of doing others". We open the black box of ad hoc SC indicators by addressing the distinctiveness among types of participation, as well as their mutual connections.
Trust is key for achieving economic and political goals (Coleman 1990; Newton 2006; Putnam 1993) . The "virtuous circle" between trust and participation is seemingly a central conception in SC (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Putnam 1993) . However, the direction of causality between trust and participation could run both ways. Instrumental variables (IV) techniques use quasi-experimental exogenous variation to disentangle one causality direction.
To study SC, researchers consider multilevel empirical strategies, comparing some components of SC across countries, or regions within a country. Some studies only deal with aggregate data, following the path of (Putnam 2000; Keele 2005) . Others focus on subnational explanatory factors, keeping an aggregate perspective (Freitag 2006; Hero 2007; Hiskey and Bowler 2005) . A third branch links individual and aggregate subnational data to study the influence of economic, political, and institutional context factors (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Glaeser et al. 2002; Letki 2006) , or racial fragmentation and income inequality La Ferrara 2000, 2002; Letki 2008; Tesei 2012) on individual responses. This research help us understand the SC formation at the micro-level, a perceived weakness of SC theorists (Hero 2007; Rothstein and Stolle 2008) . Here, we also present an international perspective along similar lines. Klesner (2007) provides evidence for Latin American countries, showing that participation in non-political organizations and trust are associated with greater civic engagement.
The idea that social behavior is more than the sum of individual participation choices is core in SC theory (Coleman 1990 ). Durlauf (2002) formalizes the empirical analysis of these issues, building on Manski (1993) . The SC literature also associates the impact of political design and institutions in SC creation (McLaren and Baird 2006) . Freitag (2006) discusses that local government autonomy, efficiency of government policies, expenditure, and consensus democracy potentially influence SC formation.
Modeling Participation Using Utility Index
Following Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman (1990) , individuals obtain emotional, social and pecuniary gains through their interaction in social networks, but also have pecuniary and time-use costs for associative life. In our model, individuals choose a continuous participation intensity in social activities to maximize their net benefit, given a vector of individuals' characteristics X, and the political and institutional context variables vector, Y .
Assuming that the benefit function B(P ; X, Y ) is increasing and strictly concave, and that the cost function C(P ; X, Y ) is increasing and convex, the optimal intensity equalizes the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of participation intensity. The latter condition implicitly defines an optimal choice of intensity depending on X and Y , P = G(X, Y ), depicted in Figure 1 in terms of weekly hours devoted to participation. The net utility index obtained from participation activities has a bliss point, which defines the optimal individual behavior, given X and Y .
[Place Figure 1 
near here.]
For various reasons presented in Valdivieso (1998) , individuals are naturally inclined to participate and cooperate, but face opportunity costs varying according to individual and contextual characteristics. We express P (X, Y ) as a linear approximation
where P i is the participation intensity of individual i; X i are individual, predetermined characteristics affecting the participation, such as gender, age, etc. Because earnings could be affected by social networks, we do not include it in X i . 5 The vector Y m(i) contains features of the municipality m(i) in which individual i lives, including physical, geographical, institutional, and political municipality characteristics. We allow for non-monotonic responses of age and schooling by adding their quadratic terms.
Incorporating Social Effects
Manski (1993) seminal paper presents a model with social interactions to study how social behavior influences individual behavior. Thus, in our setup an individual participates more in a community with high participation of others because of benefits associated to large networks. Thus, we introduce aggregate participation as a right-hand side variable
Individuals forecast using all information, assuming common knowledge of participation equation
(1) and availability of the information set
individual computes the expected participation value as
Substituting back into equation (1) yields
When population characteristics matter in individual choices, there are externalities in the process of SC formation, which allows testing for social effects (Manski 1993) . The individual participation intensity decision changes incentives for others' choices. The model expresses an equilibrium in which (1) individuals make their decisions according to the aggregate participation intensity, and (2) individuals' participation choices are consistent with aggregate behavior.
In a setup of continuous participation intensity with potential social effects and no endogenous regressor such as trust, the parameters are identified if there is at least one X i whose municipality average level X m(i) does not affect participation intensity (Durlauf 2002) . This is not necessary in our detailed model for Chile because municipal averages X m(i) and individuals' X i variables come from different sources (CASEN and LAPOP datasets, respectively). Moreover, we can test for social effects in equation by studying the joint significance of the parameters associated with X m(i) (Manski 1993 ).
5 Our results are a reduced form of the effect of exogenous variables on participation, including earnings side effects.
Introducing Social Trust
Our conception of trust is a continuous latent variable observed in discrete categories, a standard approach in empirical models of discrete choice (Train 2009 ). To some extent, it resembles the amount of money players give in the first round of trust games (Glaeser et al. 2000; Migheli 2012 
Estimating equation (3), without considering its simultaneous determination, leads to a bias such
where subindex N E stands for neglected endogeneity, and σ 2 u is the variance of the idiosyncratic error term of participation. This simplified framework illustrates the misleading conclusion obtained from ignoring endogeneity. A positive partial correlation between trust and participation is due to a large causal effect of trust on participation and/or the causal effect of participation on trust, a classic result in the simultaneous equation literature. While we cannot directly infer θ in a framework with cross-equation correlations and heterogeneous responses, we highlight a key factor behind the endogeneity bias.
We use an instrumental variable, Z, which provides a quasi-experimental source of variation for trust that allows us to disentangle its causal impact on participation. The modern literature on IVs 6 For a derivation of this result, see our Online Appendix. emphasizes heterogeneous responses of the outcome (participation) to changes of trust, induced by changes of an instrument Z. 7 Heterogeneous responses make identification of average effects harder because individuals respond to the instrument in different ways. Angrist et al. (2000) show the assumptions for estimating a local average treatment effect (LATE) for the case of a continuous treatment:
1. Independence: The instrument Z is independent of the outcome P conditional on observable individual and municipal information (X i , Y m(i) ), i.e. Z is as good as randomly assigned given observable exogenous variables. 
Under the assumptions above, the estimated causal effect of trust T on participation P equals a weighted average of the marginal impact of trust on participation, across the population that changes trust in response to changes of Z. Large and sensitive-to-instrument groups are heavily weighted Angrist et al. 2000, 504 , Theorem 1.
A natural IV is being a crime victim 8 , conditional on individual and contextual factors. The empirical detrimental effect of crime on trust is established in the literature (Keele 2005; Lederman et al. 2005) . Assumptions 1 and 2 combined are usually called "validity". Despite the crucial importance of these two assumptions for the method, they cannot be statistically tested, only defended on theoretical grounds (Angrist and Pischke 2009) .
By conditioning on personal and municipal characteristics, we make individuals comparable in terms of observed variables. Hence, being a crime victim is likely to be driven by luck for individuals sharing the same gender, age, educational level, marital status, and racial background (among other traits), who live in municipalities sharing many common features. Moreover, spatial segregation is high and increasing in Chile and Latin America (Sabatini et al. 2001) . Indeed, Santiago ranks as the most segregated city among OECD countries, as other Chilean cities (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013). In the case of the USA, despite a decreasing trend 7 Applications of IV techniques are increasing in political science (Sovey and Green 2011) . 8 The exact wording of the question is "Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?". While the respondent's interpretation of this question is uncertain, we guess it covers offenses such as robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, kidnapping, etc. committed by strangers.
in racial urban segregation since the 1970s, segregation by income is on the rise (Watson et al. 2006 ). Thus, individuals live and work in homogeneous neighborhoods, and hence, conditional on individual traits, being a crime victim is similar to a random assignment. A common assumption in the literature, weaker than independence, is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which means that the effects of a "treatment" for one individual do not affect another. Thus, independence may fail if we were to overlook social effects.
Exclusion requires that changes in participation intensity be due entirely to the impact on trust caused by the crime event, conditional on individual and municipality characteristics. A concern is that participation may drop due to the income loss generated by the crime. However, participation requires little resources, other than personal time. Moreover, controlling for municipal characteristics, age, and education, the individual socioeconomic status is held constant after being a crime victim. Intrinsic motivations also are fundamental to explain participation in associations
Relevance (no weak instruments), a key issue in recent literature, can be tested, defining an acceptable bias level for IV estimates (Stock and Yogo 2005) . We provide relevance tests in individual equations, such as Cragg and Donald (1993) (homoscedastic random errors) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) 
(clustered variance matrix). Critical values are provided by Stock and Yogo (2005).
The monotonicity assumption, which is not testable, should hold, conditional on observable characteristics and contextual variables. The IV estimator identifies a LATE for the complier subpopulation, i.e. individuals trusting less due to a crime or bribe request. Such events generate suspicious attitudes toward others' actions and intentions. Psychological evidence shows that depression, anxiety, fear of crime, and avoidance appear as a consequence of a violent crime (Norris and Kaniasty 1994) .
Considering Ordinal Responses
While we postulate a continuous participation intensity, the empirical counterparts are discrete variables. For instance, LAPOP data have four categories of meeting attendance to organizations ("Never", "Once or twice a year", "Once or twice a month", "Once a week"). Because discrete categories are naturally ranked, a logical solution is an ordered probit model if there is a normal random component in the intensity. However, its non-linear nature impedes the interpretation of the model estimates as a LATE and the formal testing of weak instruments, mostly developed for linear models. We still pursue the standard ordered probit in our Online Appendix (OA).
Instead, our preferred approach transforms the ordinal probit into a linear setup, following the method of Terza (1987) , further expanded by Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) , henceforth called linear ordered probit (LOP). 9 We exploit IV methods due to the linearity of the model. The additional assumption is that the latent variable participation (or trust) intensity is also normally distributed, besides the idiosyncratic error term. Hence, we map the intensity thresholds by defining categories on the normal standard distribution as follows:
where F k is the frequency of responses in category k and Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a standard normal distribution. Moreover, C 0 = −∞ and C K = +∞. We compute the average trust intensity conditional on being between two thresholds as follows
where k(i) stands for the category chosen by individual i. We obtain a first-stage equation for trust with reduced form parameters that do not identify the causal effect of participation on trust:
where v i ≡ v i + T i − T i adds the idiosyncratic and measurement error due to data discreteness.
Assuming the same for participation, we can write an equation using P i as a proxy for participation intensity P i .
where
includes measurement errors of trust and participation. The linear system of (7) and (8) are estimated using a two-stage least squares (TSLS) or a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator. The latter is preferable under potentially weak instruments (Stock and Yogo 2005) .
The variance matrix of the estimates of (7) and (8) requires an adjustment to account for measurement errors included in u i and v i . Analytical results are hard to obtain due to endogenous regressors and cross-equation correlations. Hence, we compute a bootstrapped variance matrix to test our hypotheses, including participation and trust measurement errors in all repetitions (nearly 500). 10
9 Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) call it the Probit-OLS method, but this name is misleading since we use an IV estimator. 10 With some random samples, the estimation fails to converge, so that the total number of replications actually varies.
Considering Multiple Participation Categories
There are five kinds of social organizations in LAPOP data: religious, parental, community, professional, and political. Since individuals simultaneously choose a participation intensity in each category, these choices are interrelated. These kinds may be complements or substitutes. Participation in certain activities may change the net benefit of participation in other types.
We allow for free contemporaneous correlations across participation and trust equations. Hence, we have a 6-dimensional recursive LOP model, estimated via Simulated LIML (SLIML). We use numerical integration with the GHK ( Table A1 in the OA. Individual characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, religion, schooling, and urban status are also in LAPOP. 12 In addition, we include geographic dichotomic variables (states for the USA, Brazil, and Mexico; and regions for Chile).
Municipal Demographic Variables
To test for social effects of participation in Chile, we obtain data on average demographic charac- be harder since our estimates would be biased towards zero (attenuation bias). Part of the Table   A3 in the OA summarizes these data.
Institutional, Political and Other Context Variables
The institutional, budgetary and administrative data of municipalities are obtained from SINIM 2008, 2010 and 2012. Among these variables in Table A3 , we consider contextual data including the population density (thousands of inhabitants per square kilometer), and the log of average per capita municipal household income. We also report statistics on the effects of the 8. democracy does. When majority and minority citizens are involved in policy-decision-making and monitoring, participation increases (Freitag 2006) . To measure voting consensus in each municipality, we construct a Herfindahl Index of voting concentration. Used as a measure of industry concentration, it is computed as the sum of squared voting shares of each candidate in the last mayor election. We also consider the impact of the political party of the mayor, counting the five most important Chilean parties. 15 We hypothesize that some parties may affect certain social organizations of citizens due to their ideologies. We also include the voting share of the mayor in office, since it captures local political leadership on citizen participation.
Inequality measures
Income inequality and racial diversity empirically discourage participation and trust levels La Ferrara 2000, 2002; Hero 2007) . While racial composition is homogeneous in Chile, the country is socially and spatially segregated (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013). Following Tesei (2012) , who finds that inequality between racial groups affects trust in the USA, we consider inequality between and within educational attainment groups, resembling high and low socioeconomic classes. A Theil municipal inequality index equals the sum of "within"
and "between" Theil indices for each class. These two sources of inequality may have different impacts on participation categories. We also explore the municipal and regional Gini coefficients as measures of inequality, as well as the municipal poverty rate in our OA. Tables 1 and 2 display the SLIML estimates of the multivariate LOP model for five types of associational life and trust. Because linear ordered models assume a continuous participation intensity with a standard normal distribution, a coefficient represents the standard deviations of participation (or trust) intensity generated by a marginal change of the related explanatory variable. For instance, the effect of being male is -0.182 standard deviation (SD) for participation in religious, being significant at 1% (see Table 1 ).
Estimation and Results

Detailed Model for Chile
To learn about relevant factors, we compute several p-values of Wald tests to assess (1) significance of a factor; (2) factor significance for a particular kind of participation; and (3) equal effects for all kinds of participation, a fair comparison since intensities are standardized. The first column of Table 3 shows that all individual factors are significant, except race. The last column shows significant differences across kinds of participation, except income inequality (in the margin) and individual race. These findings empirically justify the study of the SC formation process considering heterogeneous participation types.
We report the McFadden R 2 = 0.047 as a standard goodness-of-fit measure for maximum likelihood models. While this magnitude may seem modest, the whole contribution of explanatory variables increases the joint likelihood by roughly 1268%. 16 Equation measures of goodness-of-fit are the log of standard deviation of the equation's error term log σ. In Table 2 , we can see that religious participation has the poorest fit, while political has the best. Correlations between error terms are shown as their hyperbolic arctangent that monotonically maps the interval [−1, 1] into the real line. 17 Finally, we report the Cragg and Donald (1993) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) tests for weak instruments. Both compare favorably to critical values of Stock and Yogo (2005) , suggesting that equation-by-equation IV estimators biases are substantially lower than 10% of OLS estimates.
Religious
The first columns of Tables 1 and 2 show that males participate significantly less than women in religious organizations. Tables 1 and 3 jointly show a significant increasing convex age profile.
This is consistent with a life-cycle hypothesis, in which individuals find psychological alleviation in religious beliefs, as they grow older. We cannot rule out an alternative cohort explanation: the elderly are more religious than the young. While family (marital status, and number of children) matters for religious participation, race does not (see Table 3 ). All Christian groups participate more, led by protestants and evangelicals. Table 3 shows that social effects are significant for this category. Time effects show a declining trend in religious participation over time.
Political-institutional factors are significant in the baseline model, as shown in Table 3 . This is a standard way to estimate parameters restricted into a closed interval.
participation (Freitag 2006) . Inequality between socioeconomic groups (college vs. non-college) significatively reduces religious participation, and average income per capita raises it. Thus, religious participation is stronger in high and relatively homogeneous socioeconomic-level municipalities. Remarkably, a trust reduction due to a crime experience significantly increases religious participation, for individuals shifting their trust intensity (LATE effect, as in Angrist et al. 2000) . This result is highly significant and robust across additional specifications in our OA as well.
We interpret that religious organizations attract individuals with a trust loss who seek a network sharing moral precepts that signal trustworthiness. This agrees with evidence of leery individuals having more frequent interactions with their relatives (Uslaner 2008 , and references therein). We estimate the model assuming that trust is exogenous in Tables A4 and A5 of our Online Appendix (OA), yielding a positive non-significant coefficient. Equation (5), suggests there may be a positive marginal impact of participation on trust, in line with SC (trust) formation through participation.
To some extent, our evidence supports Uslaner (2002 Uslaner ( , 2008 instead of the "virtuous circle" of Putnam (2000) .
Cross-equation correlations show that unobserved factors behind religious participation are significantly positively correlated to unobserved factors spurring participation in parental centers, community organizations, and trust. Christian churches (in particular Catholic) own many schools in Chile and actively influence local communities, linking religious, parental and community associations.
Parental
Participation intensity in school parent associations is lower for non-Christians and "mestizos".
Gender differences are large: males' participation intensity is 0.339 SD lower than females'. Married individuals participate somewhat more than partners or divorcés; in turn, these categories surpass singles' intensity. There is also a significant life-cycle age profile, implying a peak at 27.7 years old, similar to previous evidence (Glaeser et al. 2002; Putnam 2000) . Trust LATE effect is negative but non-significant for this kind of participation. Aggregate demographic variables at the municipality level, as well as factors related to the 2010 earthquake are not individually significant, Among political-institutional factors, an increase of 1% in the number of organizations per capita raises parental participation intensity in 0.05 SD, which suggests that institutional support matters. In addition, a Party for Democracy (PPD) mayor in office reduces parental participation by 0.15 SD. This may be interpreted as a substitution of parents' efforts in communities ruled by a leftist mayor advocating greater government influence on educational policies. 18 Table 3 shows 18 Since the massive Chilean educational strikes of 2006 and 2011, leftist parties such as the Party for Democracy that institutional factors affect parental participation at 10% of significance. There is no evidence of trends, nor influence of unobserved factors related to other categories.
Community
Participation in "Committee meetings to improve community" is significantly lower for males and higher for Catholics. Urban individuals in low population density areas participate more, indicating that the suburban lifestyle promotes community associativity. The significant participation age profile is hump-shaped, peaking at age 86.2, suggesting either a generational decline, or a genuine life-cycle of community participation. We also find non-significant social effects. Institutional variables jointly matter for this sort of participation, as shown in Table 3 . Subsidies significantly increase participation. Having a National Renovation Party, Socialist Party, or Christian Democrat Party mayor significantly increases community participation. This could be partially explained by parties' organizational structure, a hypothesis raised by Joignant (2012) . Income distribution has a complicated effect on community participation. While the poverty rate has a large and significant impact on community participation intensity (an increase of 1% of poverty rate increases intensity by 0.017 SD), the average income also increases this intensity. In addition, Theil inequality index within socioeconomic groups deters community participation. Together, this evidence suggests that community participation is stronger in poor or rich but relatively homogeneous municipalities. Conversely, middle-class heterogeneous municipalities participate less, possibly due to difficult coordination among individuals pursuing conflicting goals. In this case, the marginal local average impact of trust does not generate significant changes in participation. Finally, the unobserved factors of other kinds of participation are jointly significant to explain community participation.
Professional
Participation intensity in "professional, merchants, producers, and farmers associations" is significantly higher for male and urban individuals. The effect of age describes a significantly hump-shaped profile peaking at age 58.1. Education also shows a significant increasing and convex profile for six or more years of schooling. The earthquake significantly revitalized professional associations in the most affected areas (measured through the Mercalli index squared). After the disaster, professional have advocated broader state support for public education.
organizations received an unusual demand for their collective specialized action. Among contextual variables, only inequality between educational groups negatively impacts professional participation.
Idiosyncratic factors of other categories, especially community, increase this professional participation.
Political
Gender and marital status are not statistically significant in this category. Catholicism negatively affects participation intensity. Political participation shows a hump-shaped age profile, peaking at age 52.4. The education profile is significantly increasing and convex for individuals with more than 6.7 years of schooling. In addition, the estimates show a significant decreasing trend since 2008. Table 3 shows that political participation is the less influenced category by individual factors in relative terms. Aggregate composition of age and education significantly impacts political participation, reflected into social effect, significant at 12.5% (see Table 3 ).
Among institutional and contextual variables, the availability of organizations and a greater population density significantly decrease political participation intensity, perhaps by facilitating people engaging in alternative social networks. Moreover, a mayor of the rightist UDI party increases intensity participation. High and low classes seemingly participate more as per capita family income and poverty rate positively affect this category. Inequality between socioeconomic groups has a negative effect, suggesting more difficult political coordination under a mixed composition of social classes. Unobserved factors behind professional participation are significant explanatory factors for political intensity. Income, inequality, political-institutional features, and idiosyncratic factors are the most important factors for this category.
Trust
Among individual variables, urban origin increases 0.188 SD of trust intensity, while being married increases by 0.11 SD with respect to widows. Table 3 shows a significant hump-shaped age profile, peaking at age 30.5. The education effect on trust intensity has an increasing and convex profile for schooling higher than 4.9 years. Religion, family, and gender seem not to affect trust intensity overall. During the municipal election year 2008, trust was 0.269 SD higher than other years.
Some aggregate demographic variables are individually significant, aligned with significance of social effects in Table 3 . The earthquake significantly affected trust intensity. In municipalities suffering a Mercalli intensity of 9 (Maule and Biobío), individuals increase their trust intensity by 0.218 SD.
In contrast, witnessing vandalism or neighborhood damage after the earthquake decreased trust by 0.221 and 0.108 SD, respectively. This suggests that the earthquake impact depended strongly in personal experience. While Chong et al. (2011) find a negligible effect of the earthquake on trust, their experiments do not consider personal consequences of earthquakes.
Political-institutional factors significantly explain trust in Table 3 . Expenditure in social organizations reduces trust intensity, whereas an increase in income subsidies generates a large increase of trust intensity. This suggests that citizens trust less when government funds are spent in intermediate organizations. Among political variables, an increase of 0.01 units of the Herfindahl index increases trust by 0.113 SD. Together with a negative effect of incumbent mayor voting, trust grows when the political scenario shows few, but electorally strong, candidates. A rise in municipal average income, with significance at 10%, increases trust intensity by a large amount, while income inequality measures do not matter. Trust is greater for individuals participating in religious and community associations. Importantly, being a crime victim decreases trust intensity by 0.159 SD, which confirms that the theoretically and statistically relevant mechanism of the instrument works as hypothesized (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
Multiple Countries Model
In this section, we present individual variable effects on participation and trust intensity displayed in Tables 4 -7. Formal hypothesis testing in Table 8 shows that all specific aspects (family, race, religion, age, education, gender, state/regional, time, dependence) are jointly relevant in the SC formation process, with a partial exception of racial aspects in Brazil and Mexico. In addition, the null hypothesis of equal impact of factors on all participation types is strongly rejected in almost all cases, exceptions being racial aspects in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. In Tables 4 -7, both Cragg and Donald (1993) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) show relevant instruments, indicating that IV estimator bias should not worry us.
Religious
Among studied countries, religious participation is atypical for the USA. Male participation intensity is significantly higher than female's in the USA, a pattern reversed for the other countries. Figure   2 depicts the U-shaped age profile of the USA for religious participation; in contrast, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico show profiles increasing with age. Wald tests in Table 8 show that age is a significant factor in all cases. Education also increases religious participation in the USA, but is non-significant in Chile, Brazil and Mexico. USA individuals with a graduate or college diploma exhibit higher than average participation intensity, while high school graduates participate less than average.
Participation intensity in the USA is lower for partner, single, and divorced individuals, a result similar to Brazil and Mexico. We found no effect of number of children, as opposed to Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) . Hispanic origin decreases by 0.142 SD of participation intensity with respect to other ethnic groups (omitted category) in the USA. Religious participation in the studied countries is significantly higher for Christian religions compared to non-Christians. Among Christians, Catholics show lower intensity. Trend patterns are quite different in the four analyzed countries.
A decrease of trust intensity of one SD significantly increases religious participation intensity by 0.3 to 0.6 SD for different countries. Our estimates neglecting endogeneity in our OA (Tables A6   -A9) Age profiles in Figure 2 show hump-shaped profiles, except for the USA, which is decreasing and not significant according to Table 8 . Education significantly increases parental intensity only in the USA and Mexico. Family aspects are important for all countries, showing that married/partner status (compared to singles) and the number of children increases intensity. Racial factors are nonsignificant. Religious affiliation has distinct impacts: in the USA and Mexico, Catholics participate the most; in Brazil, protestants and evangelicals prevail; in Chile all Christian groups are similar.
As in religious participation, a negative impact on trust generated by a crime experience locally increases participation, with the exception of Chile. When endogeneity is neglected (Tables A6 -A9 in OA) there are positive significant effects for the USA and non-significant ones for the rest.
There are significant cross-equation correlations for all countries, with lower strength in Chile.
Community
This participation is significantly higher for males, except in Chile. Urbanization deters participation in Brazil and Mexico, but the opposite occurs in Chile. Figure 2 portrays a similar age profile for Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, but suggests a stark rise in community participation among the elderly in the USA. Education significantly raises intensity in the USA, Brazil, and Mexico, but not much in Chile (see also Table 8 ). Family issues matter little in most countries, with the partial exception of Mexico (joint significance in Table 8 
Political
Males show greater participation intensity in the USA and Brazil, but not in Chile nor Mexico.
Urban residents participate less in Brazil and Mexico, but not in Chile. The age profiles shown in Figure 2 are similar to those in community and professional categories for all countries. Family issues are not relevant, as shown in Table 8 . Race/ethnic differences are only important in the USA, showing blacks and especially Hispanics, as low intensity groups. The impact of Catholicism is significant only for Chile (negative) and Mexico (positive). Political participation has no time trend in Chile and Brazil, in contrast to the USA and Mexico. As in other categories, an exogenous trust change is negatively related to political participation, except in Chile.
Trust
Males trust more in all cases, except Chile. Urbanization affects trust negatively in Brazil and
Mexico, but positively in Chile. In Figure 2 , we see that older individuals significantly trust more, especially in the USA. We find a positive effect of education on trust levels for all cases but Brazil, which also find Borgonovi (2012) 
Robustness Checks
We consider several variations of our baseline assumptions for our two applications. The detailed results are found in our OA.
Regular Ordered Probit
In the subsection 3.3 we explain our preference for the LOP approach instead of a more conventional ordered probit. Since LOP relies on the assumption of normally distributed participation and trust intensities, we estimate and test hypotheses in a multivariate ordered probit to see if our results remain (see section F of the OA). No major conclusions change from our baseline analysis.
Alternative Instruments
We assess the possibility of alternative instruments satisfying conditions enumerated in subsection 3.2. Bribe request 19 is a variable, reported in LAPOP, serving as a valid source of exogenous variation for trust. In the OA, section G, we show that its joint use with criminality works in the expected way (i.e, a bribe request deters trust). We also consider the interaction between crime victim experience and gender, as an alternative IV set. A priori, women may be more affected by crime experiences, but this only holds for Mexico. Introducing this additional instrument reduces Cragg and Donald (1993) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) tests, but the main conclusions do not change, as the tests of hypothesis show in Tables A22, A27 , and A32 in the OA. In all cases, the induced reduction of trust generally spurs participation types. As in the baseline case, we find non-significant effects in some categories for Chile.
Municipal Fixed Effects
We formulate and estimate a model with municipal fixed effects for the detailed Chilean case to assess the robustness of contextual factors. We only consider municipalities with more than √ N individuals, N being total number of observations. This specification is a harsh test on the empirical relevance of variables X m(i) , Y m(i) , since their impacts only come from temporal variation of municipal characteristics. However, this test may be too stringent because all cross-sectional contextual variation is are taken away. In our OA, we display the results in section H. Conclusions are quite robust, but some contextual factors become non-significant.
Alternative Inequality Measures
In section I of the OA, we present our results for more conventional measures of income inequality as SC determinants (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Hero 2007 ), using Gini indices at the municipal and regional level in Chile. Using these measures, inequality becomes non-significant to explain participation types and trust in Chile, in line with complications reported by Hero (2007) for the USA.
The rest of our results remain roughly unchanged. This result shows that using a decomposable Theil index allows us to uncover interesting effects of income inequality in Chile.
Our model provides a better understanding of the mechanisms behind SC formation. What did we learn from these results? First, participation in organizations (SC formation) is a multidimensional and heterogeneous phenomenon. Each kind of associative life is influenced by distinct factors in particular ways. Benefits and costs of different kinds of activities exhibit a substantial interpersonal variation due to individual and contextual factors. We find robust empirical evidence against equal effects of main determinants across different kinds of participation. The diversity of factors and their varying relative importance show that SC formation responds to practical dimensions of life, which is consistent with a rational decision approach. Thus, our empirically-based view highlights individual considerations and tones down a communitarian perspective.
Second, we learn which contextual factors explain more across different participation categories, controlling for individual traits, in our first application. Political-institutional factors matter. Since mayors' political affiliations influence parental, community, and trust categories, ideological or organizational partisan elements transmitted through local governments impact associational life.
Monetary subsidies, interactively assigned by central and local governments, impact religious, community and trust categories. Resources may be targeted to foster certain kinds of participation since religious and social-class cleavages explain Chilean politics (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003; Valenzuela et al. 2007 ). The evidence also suggests that an election with few strong candidates increases trust. Social effects (Durlauf 2002; Manski 1993 ) influence trust and religious categories, probably spread by moral/ethic precepts of role models. Community and political participation flourish in high-and low-income municipalities. Inequality between educational groups deters professional, political, and religious participation, probably due to coordination obstacles for individuals with conflicting interests. We also show that the 2010 earthquake increased community and professional participation, but had a negative impact on trust if a person witnessed vandalism or neighborhood damages. Therefore, the focus on the impact of contextual factors on individuals emerges as an alternative approach to aggregate visions of SC.
Third, we learn the impact of individual traits on participation decisions, controlling for geographic and time fixed effects in our multi-country model. All countries, except Chile, exhibit greater male participation intensity in community, professional, political and trust categories. Religious and parental category show greater female participation intensity in all cases but the USA.
Age profiles of participation look similar for Chile, Mexico and Brazil; the USA shows a much greater relative increase for the elderly in all kinds except parental (see Figure 2) . Education is important for almost all types of participation in the USA and Mexico, but this influence is lower in Chile and Brazil. The effect of race is larger in the USA than in the other countries studied. The effect of family factors is similar across studied countries, with married individuals showing greater intensity, in line with Putnam (2000, 277) . In addition, geographical variation within countries is relevant for all participation categories and countries, but the USA.
[Place Figure 3 near here.]
Fourth, we estimate the effect of trust on participation, a perennial issue in SC literature, recognizing endogeneity, heterogeneous causal responses, and the ordinal nature of the data. The evidence, with some exceptions for Chile, indicates a negative local average causal effect on participation due to a negative trust shock (crime or bribe request experience). Our findings are somewhat close to Uslaner (2002) and disregard Putnam's virtuous circle, a seemingly predominant view in the literature. Large differences between estimations that consider endogeneity and those that neglect it may be rationalized by a large effect of participation on trust. In response to a negative trust shock, individuals intensify participation in associations with individuals sharing similar interests and values. The study of SC formation would be enriched by a Hobbesian conception of human social behavior, since the increase in participation is presumably motivated by higher insecurity and self-interest. This contrasts with a Tocquevillian emphasis on intrinsic cooperative motivation as a source of SC. We highlight rational individual choices, motivated by particular personal features, conditional on contextual factors, which are justified on empirical grounds with fewer restrictive assumptions.
Fifth, we also find positive correlations among idiosyncratic factors, uncorrelated to all observable variables. Presumably, these psychological or cultural individual factors motivate people to trust and to engage in social interactions. Hence, participation and trust may appear positively correlated because some individuals are idiosyncratically prone to participate and trust. However, an adverse exogenous shock to trust generates a participation increase, probably a greater attachment to reliable networks, and a reduction of interpersonal trust. Our deconstruction of SC capital formation disentangles the local causal effect of trust on participation, from factors simultaneously generating them. The former is a true causal effect; the latter is just correlation induced by a third unobserved variable. These concepts are summarized in Figure 3 . While we have no estimate of the causal effect of participation on trust, it is probably positive according to results in subsection 3.2.
Finally, we merge several considerations in a multidimensional, yet interpretable model. Our model tries to take apart SC formation elements like a mechanic disassembles an automobile engine.
We know what the engine does, but we need to identify its critical parts and understand how they relate one to another, keeping in mind they function together. Hopefully, our work provides a deeper understanding of SC formation and helps systematize our knowledge with a rigorous empirical basis.
26 Notes: 100 × p-values of Wald tests reported using the bootstrapped variance matrix. P-values lower than 5% are highlighted.
In the first column, we test joint significance of corresponding variables. We test significance of variables by kind of participation in columns 2-7. In the last column, we test for the equality of impacts across participation types.
